qualification of good faith (bona fide) for actions and obligations. This was a recognisable standard for individual interactions within the later medieval common law, just as it had been civilians, canonists, and theologians on the continent. 11 A requirement of faithfulness was even set out in the very name of the action at common law which developed in the sixteenth century to account for contracts (assumpsit et fideliter promisit).
12
By contrast, what pertained within English law to faithlessness -specifically the inability to keep faith with other Christians -was obscure ever since the early emergence of this prejudice around the time of the Crusades. It may have been natural for William of Newburgh (1136 -1198 to associate the Jews of York with "perfidy," for this had become something of an ethnographic trope across western Europe since at least Isidore of Seville (560-636), but how far such rhetoric can be said to have influenced English law is certainly a question. 13 Lots of Jews bought and sold land and other things in England without much difficulty or harassment;
or, at least, they did until 1290, when Edward I orchestrated a widespread eviction of Jews entirely on the basis of what he perceived to be the pernicious effects of their money-lending, rather than their faithlessness. 14 With England purged of its Jewish population during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, that left few subjects of the realm around to identify openly as non-Christians -and none, it is surely more important for the purposes of this article, to record their pleas before the courts of common law. Not until 1520 was the inability of a "pagan" to have an action at common law first observed by Justice Richard Broke on a case of trespass in the Court of Common Pleas: to Broke's mind, the circumstances of that case -concerning the disputed ownership between two Christian Englishmen of a bloodhound -required a distinction between damages and injury, for which purpose it was necessary to run through the legal disabilities of outlaws, traitors, and pagans (all of whom featured alongside women and villeins). 15 Pagans belonged to this motley crew of common-law rejects owing to their inability to keep faith and swear oaths, a disability that was subsequently expanded, through legislation, to make them out to be the enemies of the crown.
16
In other words, whereas good faith could attach itself to customs governing the intention and performance of individuals within contractual relations, and fidelity could attach itself to the symbolism and ceremony of loyalty and ligeance, infidelity was a vague condition of legal disability up to the end of the Tudor period. Coke's importance owes to his association of infidels with three particular characteristics in the early seventeenth century: infidels could be conquered and taken over in toto; infidels could be traded with only at the discretion of the monarch; infidels could never give evidence at common law. While these novelties were conceived in England from dicta and commentaries offered to explain conditions in England,
The Norman conquest was even discussed, if as an abstraction, for Calvin's Case was less about the reception of foreign conquerors in English law so much as it was about the reception of foreign-born subjects. 24 For Coke, the conquest of 1066 had no relevance except insofar as it generated a mixture of claims by descent in Jersey and Guernsey, which formed only small parts of a great historical survey in which little could be said for the conquest of 1066. 25 Michelborne had revealed another side to Coke: in the report, Coke identifies among the personal powers of the monarch a right to impede traders from leaving the realm to communicate with non-Christians. In this was an assertion that ran contrary to those of a burgeoning free trade lobby that parliament through legislation should wrest control of commerce from the crown.
35
The third of Coke's contributions in shaping the defective personality of infidels at common law differs in form and context to Calvin's Case and Michelborne, where his arguments take the form of dicta and reason in judgments. Rather, it would be in his scholarly commentaries and elaboration on the work of the English jurist Littleton, The Institutes of the Lawes of England (1628-44) , that Coke professed his belief that infidels, along with those of "non-sane memory," could never appear as witnesses in England, and only Christians could take oaths. […] so that the warre be undertaken to this ende, to re-claime and reduce those savages from their barbarous kinde of life, and from their brutish and ferine manners to humanitie, pietie, and honestie'. These remarks, which place the preacher within an older-fashioned 'holy war' genre more so than they do within the common law tradition, were at odds with those of contemporaries like Leyva, Molina, Las Casas, and Vitoria. In this period, for the first time since Coke, infidels made a comeback in the common law reports. These reports are highly abbreviated, but appear to reveal some ambivalence with regard to his dicta: whereas the conquest of infidels was easily invoked as a point of contrast to discussions about legal receptivity in Ireland and Wales, there is evidence of a slight move away from the idea that infidels were automatically the "perpetual enemies" of the king (oddly, however, in a case concerning the recovery of property seized from a Christian Dutch merchant).
47
Infidels were soon to figure in separate discussions about the empire as a result of the great doubts which abounded in the middle decades of the seventeenth century over the status of overseas colonies and plantations. That Mansfield should have offered in the process some new dicta of his own, advice more befitting the wars of the latter eighteenth century, should not be surprising either, nor indeed should it surprise that it would be these dicta which gave Campbell v Hall (1774) its weighty importance in the imperial constitution. Among other things, Mansfield went out of his way to clarify the relationship between crown, parliament, and colonial legislatures. According to Mansfield, the king's power to create laws by his prerogative alone for Grenada was disqualified by his earlier endorsement of the installation of a legislative assembly for the island. Thereupon, only such laws as were passed by the imperial parliament, and those passed subordinately "by the assembly with the governor and council," were valid in conquered countries. Over the next few decades, those plantation colonies of the West Indies which accrued to Great Britain were governed according to this dictum, but teething problems abounded, for merely the acquisition of colonies by conquest or cession imposed no obligation upon the crown to grant local legislatures. Many colonies therefore went without legislatures for some time, wherever they were regarded, from the viewpoint of London, as unready for self-government in the English model. 63 Trinidad by dint of its mixed composition and hybrid legal system, for example, was administered after 1797 by a despotic crown governor who preferred instead to corrupt those customs he inherited from the previous Spanish régimen than to receive English laws, and this was no aberration thanks to Campbell v Hall. 64 Courtesy of Mansfield, conquest in English legal thought, though shorn of its ridiculous intolerance of nonChristian legal systems, now carried a clear message to colonial subjects that their teleological progression towards self-government was something that had to be accomplished and politely received. This too would remain a recurring theme in the imperial imagination for the next 150 years. 63 See D. J. Murray, The West Indies and the Development of Colonial Government, 1801 -1834 (Oxford, 1964 Before the Court of King's Bench, it was alleged by trover that "negroes were infidels, and the subjects of an infidel prince," and for that reason purchasable and sellable "by the custom of merchants." Mainstream reports of the case are spare and highly compressed, but it appears that the Institutes were used to facilitate an enquiry into the suitability of the analogy of villeinage, despite the very little by way of support offered by Coke (or Littleton, for that matter) on chattel slavery. In the course of subsequent argument, it then appears to have been implied that baptism was sufficient to enfranchise slaves, but until such point "there might be a property in [negroes] sufficient to maintain trover."
93
The implication that baptism might modify the personality of a formerly faithless slave was queried in dicta and ratio of subsequent case law often hinging on the technicalities of common law pleading. 94 The first case of importance would be Sir Thomas Grantham's Case (1686).
Having come into the possession of a "monster" from "the Indies," Grantham wished to make a spectacle in England of his rare disfigurement. Upon returning to England in 1685, however, the slave was baptised and detained, compelling Grantham to bring a writ of replevin in order to restore his property. His action appears to have been successful notwithstanding doubts about the type of property actually restorable. 95 Trover emerged again in Gelly v Cleve (1694).
There it was held, before the Court of Common Pleas, "that trover will lie for a negro boy; for they are heathens, and therefore a man may have property in them. proposition that baptism brought about the manumission of a slave. In the end, however, this was inconsequential to the more important contention of the case, namely, as to the kind of damages awardable to slaveowners (ultimately circumscribed here to account only for the loss of service instead of value or damages). 97 One final case of importance in this window was
Smith v Gould (1705), which cast fresh doubts upon the action of trover for slave property.
Turning over Butts v Penny, and finally dismissing the notion that infidels were property by default, Chief Justice John Holt recommended that the superior action to bring was a suit in trespass upon the servitude of a captive, the ownership over whom was ambivalently conceded.
98
The real scare, first exposed in Chamberline v Harvey (but impossible without the support of the Institutes and Calvin's Case), that slaves converting to Christianity might hasten their evasion of the completest condition of chattel, carried over into the early eighteenth century.
In the slaveholding American colonies, a consensus began to emerge, from a slew of statutes, that a slave who converted after enslavement would not attain freedom, but a slave originally Christian in his or her country of birth might enjoy the case for conditional leave from bondage. 99 However bold it was to measure straight-talking colonial legislation against the abbreviated judgments of English law reports, the result of these acts was a drop in opposition among slaveholders to converting their slaves to Christianity. Reservations about slave baptism remained among a few slaveholders, particularly those in Jamaica, until the crown law officers to encourage slaveholders to christen their slaves and also to deter escapees from attempting to reach The law of England acts upon general and extensive principles: it gives liberty, rightly understood, that is, protection, to a Jew, a Turk, or a heathen, as well as to those who profess the true religion of Christ; and it will not dissolve a civil obligation between master and servant, on account of the alteration of faith in either of the parties: but the slave is entitled to the same protection it.
the southern slaveholding states of America, by contrast, lawyers tried their hardest to forget Somerset in order to develop their own common law of slavery for the nineteenth century.
108

"THE COMMON LAW WORKS ITSELF PURE"
This article has shown how, piecemeal, after Nightingale, judges in the English courts of common law aggressively queried many of the incapacities associated with the legal personality of infidels. Certainly the most stubborn of these incapacities to carry into the eighteenth century was the inability of infidels to give evidence in court. It is ironic that some of the earliest moves away from Broke and Coke on this head concerned only Christians. In
Wells v Williams (1697), for example, the plaintiff was a French Protestant who brought a suit for the recovery of debts. His action was queried owing to his status as an "alien enemy," it was alleged for Williams, amid the Nine Years War. "But now," counsel for Wells retorted, "commerce has taught the world more humanity."
It was beginning to teach the world political economy, as well. At the end of so many years of making new enemies on the continent, it was never so evident to common lawyers that it was now necessary to retain peaceful foreign merchants "sub protectione" in England, and to provide them with the fullest capacity to maintain actions at law. Finding for the French plaintiff, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas also took the opportunity to affix to the judgment a repudiation not only of Coke's dictum about perpetui inimici but also Broke's 107 It is fair to say, as well, that these accomplishments would have been far trickier were it not for the development of the new crown colony model and introduction of the carrot of self-government, both of which were the result of Mansfield's admixture of his own brand of juristic pragmatism with that of Coke's and Holt's in Campbell v Hall. 108 Wiecek, "Somerset," 118-41; Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619 -1860 (Chapel Hill, 1996 . policy requires it, and in dealings of this kind it is of infinite consequence, there should not be a failure of justice." These sentiments were then advanced, in the framework of an argument for a reforming common law tradition, by the capable solicitor general, William Murray (twelve years before swearing into the King's Bench as Lord Mansfield). For the young Mansfield, Coke's remarks from the Institutes were "not warranted by any authority, nor supported by any reason, and lastly contradicted by common experience." Recognising,
further, that the age of discovery had given way to the age of global commerce, Mansfield argued that the statutory requirement for providing oaths had fallen out of step with the times, warning that Chancery, if careless, may commit the same error:
All occasions do not arise at once; now a particular species of Indians appears; hereafter another species of Indians may arise; a statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act of parliament. 111 interesting because of its utterance before the Lord Chancellor in a court of equity. There, not only was his opinion shared, but the idea would be pushed even further by his senior colleague, John Willes, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Willes argued more persuasively than
Mansfield that the common law had to purge its impurities in order to make Christian toleration compatible with undiscriminatingly free trade. Not only bad statutes, but bad dicta, too, had to be discarded in the process. Obstructing infidels from maintaining an action in English courts was "contrary not only to the scripture but to common sense and common humanity […] ; and besides the irreligion of it, it is a most impolitic notion and would at once destroy all that trade and commerce from which this nation reaps such great benefits." 113 Now in a new Christian spirit of commerce, Hindu men were allowed to present depositions in the courts. Tradition could not entirely be abandoned in the process, however: it was clarified that Hindu testimony was permissible only because Hindus believed in their own deity.
114
Part of the magic of the English common law, from the old Year Books through to the present, is the motivation it gives to its practitioners to engage with old contexts for the purpose of evaluating the reiteration of dicta and ratio in changing political and economic circumstances.
In one sense, the common lawyers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries worked more as intellectual historians than their continental colleagues did, if only by the antiquity of the actions, the formality of the pleadings, and the encouragement they received to recall precedents in context. In another sense, however much they hoped to avoid reliving the mistakes of their ancestors, the deliberate and self-preservationist insularity of their profession instilled in its practitioners a need to keep a little distance from debates in the Commons, 
